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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are employed in 
numerous applications in different areas including military, 
ecology, and health; for example, to control of important 
information like the personnel position in a building, as a result, 
WSNs need security. However, several restrictions such as low 
capability of computation, small memory, limited resources of 
energy, and the unreliable channels employ communication in 
using WSNs can cause difficulty in use of security and protection 
in WSNs. It is very essential to save WSNs from malevolent 
attacks in unfriendly situations. Such networks require security 
plan due to various limitations of resources and the prominent 
characteristics of a wireless sensor network which is a 
considerable challenge. This article is an extensive review about 
problems of WSNs security, which examined recently by 
researchers and a better understanding of future directions for 
WSN security.  
Keywords- Security in WSNs; Wireless sensor networks; attack; 
Threats; Routing  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The progression of low-cost, low power, multifunctional 
sensor nodes have been possible by developments in wireless 
communication and electronics. Deploy of Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) is became possible by use of very small 
sensor nodes, made up of sensing, data processing, and 
communication parts, which show a meaningful enhancement 
over conventional wired sensor networks. WSNs can extremely 
be used to make easier system design and operation to monitor 
the environment without need connection with wired networks. 
In many applications WSNs can be useful, as an example to 
find and follow the passage of armed force in war, to observe 
contaminants in environment [1]. 
Security should be considered because most of sensor 
networks possess various mission-critical tasks and therefore 
they need security [2]. Undesirable information leakage and 
preparation incorrect outcomes can be happened due to 
inappropriate use of information or using wrong information. 
There are significant differences which extremely influence 
how security is obtained, despite similarity of some 
characteristics of WSNs to conventional wireless ad hoc 
networks.  Several diversity between nodes in sensor networks 
and nodes in ad hoc networks can be named including; the 
greater sensor node’s number in a sensor network in compared 
with the number of nodes in an ad hoc network, densely 
deployment of sensor nodes, tending of sensor nodes to failures 
due to rough environments and energy restrictions, regularly 
changes of the topology of a sensor network since of inability 
to success or mobility , limitation of sensor nodes in 
computation, memory, and power resources, and lack of global 
identification in sensor nodes.  
     The way of implementation of secure data-transfer 
schemes in WSNs can be affected highly by these differences, 
for instance, WSNs could be more vulnerable to denial-of-
service attacks [3]. Because of the necessities of more 
complexity in design and greater using up of energy, advanced 
anti-jamming methods are not mostly possible in a sensor 
network [4]. In addition, the restricted energy and processing 
power of nodes cause approximately impossibility in the use of 
public key cryptography. In spite of the probable achievability 
of public key cryptography in sensor networks through the 
outcomes from new researches [3, 4], it stays impossible for 
the most parts in wireless sensor networks. Instead, using of 
symmetric key cryptography is being possible in many security 
designs. The employment of keys in secure communication is a 
thing which needed in either case.  
     In a network, straight pairwise key participating 
amongst each two nodes does not have same size in compare 
with large networks which have many nodes since of great 
needs of higher storage. In WSNs a security plan must prepare 
effective key distribution as preservation the capability to 
communicate among all related nodes. Also, secure routing 
protocols must be taken into account extra to key distribution. 
The way that a node transmit packet to other nodes is 
concerned in these protocols and a key difficulty is that of 
authenticated broadcast.  
     Public key cryptography is an important factor which 
existent authenticated broadcast techniques, most of the time 
depend on. In WSNs, these methods contain high 
computational overhead causing them impracticable. Secure 
routing protocols like SPINS [5] suggested for use in WSNs 
should take these factors into account. Moreover, data 
aggregation is required in WSNs since of energy restriction [6]. 
This aggregation of sensor data requires being secured so that 
guarantees information integrity and confidentiality [7, 8]. 
     Through cryptography, secure data aggregation is 
attainable; however the restrictions in wireless sensor networks 
and the special traits of the cryptography method and routing 
schemes must be considered by an aggregation design. Being 
easily to change is too worthwhile for secure data aggregation 
protocols which permit less degrees of security for insignificant 
data, so preserving energy, and permitting greater degrees of 
security for much more important data, therefore higher energy 
consumption. It is worthwhile to have awareness of 
compromised nodes and attacks similar to any network. 
Numerous security plans grant protection so data stay 
undamaged and communication uninfluenced so little of them 
compromised [9]. The capability of a nodes or distention to 
discover different compromised nodes allows them to do 
something, as well disregarding the reconfiguring the network 
to remove the danger. In the following part in more detail the 
mentioned fields and the way that these areas are all needed to 
make a perfect WSN security plan will discussed [8, 9].  
     This paper structure as follow: in section II, we describe 
Constraints in Wireless Sensor Networks and security 
requirements in section III. In section IV discuses about 
Security Goals and security routing in section V. In section VI, 
show challenges in WSNs and talked about communication 
protocol in section VII. In section VIII, discuses about attack 
on wireless sensor networks. The end section we show 
conclusion.    
II. CONSTRAINTS IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
A great number of sensor nodes that are intrinsically 
resource-restricted exist in wireless sensor network.  These 
nodes have different characteristics such as limited processing 
ability, so little capacity storage, and limited communication 
bandwidth because of restricted power and size of the sensor 
nodes. Sometimes it is stiff to straight use the formal security 
technique in WSNs since of these restrictions. It is essential to 
be attentive of the restrictions of sensor nodes for optimization 
the routine security algorithms in WSNs [10]. Some of the 
main WSN limitations include energy limitations. In fact, the 
most important constraint for WSN is energy. Generally, there 
are several categorized parts for consumption of energy in 
sensor nodes; consuming energy and computation in 
microprocessor [11].  
     On the other hand, A WSN is susceptible to threats and 
risks, for example, an adversary can compromise a sensor, 
change the data integrity, snoop on messages, introduce wrong 
messages, and destroy network resource. Wireless nodes 
broadcast their messages to the medium differently from wired 
networks, so the security problems must be solved in WSNs. 
Some limitations are in uniting security into a WSN like 
storage restriction, communication, computation, and 
processing capabilities [20, 21]. 
     Comprehension of these restrictions and attaining 
suitable performance with security measures to address the 
necessities of an application are requirements in security 
protocols of designing need. Several security proposals at 
various layers of the protocol stack are reviewed. 
III. SECURITY REQUIERMENT  
In making a plan for WSN protocols, the rough 
environments and the danger being require further particular 
security attention. Normally, several security services such as 
confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, availability, 
nonrepudiation, freshness, forward secrecy and backward 
secrecy must be supplied. 
a) Confidentiality: To keep the privacy of significant 
data transmitted among sensor nodes, confidentiality is a 
fundamental security service. Commonly, previously of the 
packet transferring from the sending node, important sections 
of a packet are encrypted and subsequently, at the node which 
received the packet, the sections are decrypted. Attackers are 
hindered of getting access at the important information, 
without the similar decryption keys. The applications 
determine the type of information which must be encrypted. 
Sometime data in packet encrypt or packet header encrypts to 
secure identity of node [12, 14]. 
b) Authenticity: For preparation the security of 
communicating node’s identities, authenticity is vital. Any 
node must verify even if an accepted message comes from a 
true sender. In the absence of authentication, attackers without 
difficulty are able to extend wrong data into the wireless 
sensor networks. Generally, for authentication the origin of a 
message, an annexed message authentication code possibly 
employed [13]. 
c) Integrity: Integrity should be prepared to assure that 
attackers cannot change the transmitted messages. Attackers 
are able to establish interference packets to modify their 
polarities. In addition before forwarding them a malicious 
routing node can alter significant data in packets. To find 
random errors throughout packet transmissions as a cyclic 
redundancy checksum (CRC) employed for detecting them, 
similarly keyed checksum, for example a MAC use to secure 
packets against changes [12, 14, 15, 16, and 17]. 
d) Availability: Another significant capacity of a WSN 
giving services at any time they are needed is availability, 
anyway, attackers are able to activate attacks which reduce the 
performance of network or demolish the whole network. The 
most harmful danger to network availability is a denial of 
service [7]; it happens in situation that attackers, by sending 
radio interference, disrupting network protocols, or depleting 
the power of nodes through various tricky methods make the 
network unable to prepare services [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. 
IV. SECURITY GOAL 
Since of nature of broadcast in transmission medium, 
restriction of resource on sensor nodes and environments 
without control where they are deserted without any 
participant, wireless sensor networks are susceptible to several 
attacks. WSNs have the mentioned general security purposes 
similarly to other communication systems. In confidentiality, 
just to authorize parties, information is attainable to read. In 
authentication, the data is originating from an authorized party. 
If data was changed from the secure to the destination, it is 
detected in integrity. In non-repudiation, the sender and the 
receiver of massage do not have capability to reject the 
transmission. Just authorized parties can employ particular 
resources in access control. In availability, resources attainable 
to authorized parties [11, 17].  
V. CHALENGES 
     Preparing effective data aggregation, while protection 
privacy of data and integrity is a stimulating difficulty in 
wireless sensor networks since of the below factors:  
a) In WSN, trust management is difficult. Users in the 
wireless sensor networks are very keen to realize others’ 
personal information, and the communication is over public 
accessible wireless links, so the data collection is susceptible 
to attacks that endanger the privacy. The communication of 
privacy sensitive data over civilian wireless sensor networks is 
regarded unpractical, without suitable protection of privacy.  
b) During in-network aggregation, enemies can without 
difficulty change the intermediate aggregation outcomes and 
cause the final aggregation result deviate from the true value 
very much. Without security of data integrity, the data 
aggregation consequence is not reliable [22, 23].  
c)  Data collection over wireless sensor networks does 
not trust in dedicated infrastructure. In several situations, the 
number of nodes responding a question is not distinguished 
before the data aggregation is directed [17].  
d)  Resource restricted portable devices are not able to 
provide heavily computation and communication load.  
e) The necessity on exactness of information collection 
(i.e., aggregated result) causes the existing randomized 
privacy-preserving algorithms not appropriate. In addition to 
the mentioned factors, it is so difficult to secure privacy and 
integrity of data aggregation at the same time, since of typical 
privacy-preserving plans disqualify traffic peer monitoring 
process, which decrease the accessibility of information in a 
neighborhood to confirm data integrity [24]. 
VI. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL 
Wireless sensor networks employ layered architecture such 
as wired network architecture. Traits and actions of every their 
layer are presented below. 
a)  Physical Layer: Raising the reliability by decreasing 
path loss impact and shadowing is the goal of physical layer. 
For recognized connection, data rate, modulation, data 
encryption, signal detection, frequency generation and signal 
detection, this layer is reliable. 
b) Data Link Layer: Data link layer’s goal is to ensure 
interoperability amongst communication between nodes to 
nodes. This layer is responsible to recognize error, 
multiplexing. Karlof et al [25] suggested link layer security 
architecture, TinySec for WSNs to secure data link layer. For 
hardware based symmetric key encryption Naveen Sastry et al 
[29] proposed Zigbee or the 802.15.4 standard. Moreover, to 
create secure key during network deployment and 
maintenance, some scientists suggested the probable use of 
public key cryptography [26, 27], and secure code distribution 
[28].  
c)  Network Layer: Providing the best path for effective 
routing technique is the aim of Network layer. Routing the 
data from node to node, node to sink, node to base station, 
node to cluster head and vice versa are in charge of this layer. 
ID based protocols and data centric protocols are used by 
WSN for routing mechanism. In WSN, every node works as a 
router in the network (due to use broadcast method), in order 
to make secure routing protocol. Encryption and decryption 
methods are utilized for secure routing [30, 31, and 32]. 
d) Transport Layer: For external networks i.e. sensor 
network connected to the internet can use Transport Layer set 
up communication, however it is the main difficult issue in 
wireless sensor networks.   
e) Application Layer: Application Layer use to display 
ultimate yield by guarantee smooth information flow to lower 
layers. This layer is in charge of data collection, management 
and processing of the data by using the application software to 
obtain trustworthy consequences. 
VII. ATTACKS ON WSN 
There are many reasons for importance of security in 
WSN. Firstly, Wireless networks have susceptibility to 
protection attacks since of the transmission medium broadcast 
nature. Additionally, in many cases, nodes are located in a 
danger or risky environment. In this environment their 
physical safety is threatened and as a result wireless sensor 
networks have an extra safe susceptibility. 
a) Denial of Service (DoS): Malicious activity causes 
Denial of Service. Through sending extra redundant packets, 
the easiest DoS attack attempts to use up the resources 
attainable to the victim node. As a result, it impedes legal 
users in network from gaining entrance to services or 
resources to which they are entitled DoS attack is intended to 
the adversary’s effort to corrupt or demolish a network, and 
additionally for all events that reduce a network’s ability to set 
up a service [33]. Many kinds of DoS attacks in various layers 
could be presented in wireless sensor networks as an example 
at physical layer the DoS attacks could be jamming and 
tampering. At link layer, crash, and feebleness, inequitable, at 
network layer, neglect and greed, homing, misdirection, black 
holes. Malicious flooding and DE synchronization cause 
attack at transport layer [44]. 
b) Wormhole attack: Low latency connection between 
two parts of a network over which an attacker replies network 
messages is a wormhole [34]. This connection could be 
accepted by a single node forwarding messages between two 
adjacent non neighboring nodes, or by a pair of nodes in 
distinctive parts of the network communicating with each 
other. The function of wormhole attack in network is exactly 
similar to sinkhole attack which attack node closing to base 
station. 
c) Hello flood Attack: One of the easiest attacks in 
WSNs is Hello flood Attack, in which attacker broadcasts 
HELLO packets with great transmission power to sender or 
receiver. The nodes receiving the messages suppose that the 
sender node is nearest to them and sends packets by this node. 
Congestion happens in the network by this attack and it is a 
particular kind of DOS. To prevent Hello Flood attacks, 
blocking methods can be used [35]. 
TABLE I.  DENIAL-OF-SERVICE DEFENSE IN WSNS 
Network 
Layer Attack Defense 
Physical 
Jamming Spread-spectrum, priority messages 
Tampering Tamper-proofing, hiding 
Data Link 
Collision Error-correcting code 
Exhaustion Rate limit 
Unfairness Small frames 
Network 
and 
Routing 
Black holes Authorization, monitoring, redundancy 
Hello Flood 
Authentication, packet 
leashes by using 
geographic and temporal 
info 
Spoofed routing 
information & 
selective forwarding 
Egress filtering, 
authentication, monitoring 
Sybil Authorization, monitoring 
Sinkhole Redundancy 
Transport Flooding Client puzzles, Rate limitation 
 
d) Sinkhole attacks: The purpose of adversary in a 
sinkhole attack is to tempt almost all the traffic from a special 
network by way of a compromised node, making a 
metaphorical sinkhole with the adversary at the base station 
[36]. Normally, by making a compromised node which 
appeared to be particularly interesting to encircling nodes 
concerning the routing algorithm, sinkhole attacks can act 
[37].  Since of difficulty to confirm routing information which 
provided by a node, sinkhole attacks are difficult to counter.  
For instance, laptop-class adversary has a great power radio 
transmitter. This permits laptop-class adversary to supply a 
high-quality route by transmitting with adequate power to 
obtain a broad area of the network [38, 39]. 
e) Sybil attack: The definition of the Sybil attack is a 
situation that a node displays higher toward identity to the 
networks [40]. Fault-tolerant plans, allocate storage, and 
network-topology are protocols and algorithms which easily 
influenced. A distributed storage plan, as an example, could 
trust in .There being three replicas of the similar data to obtain 
a produced level of superfluity. When a compromised node 
acts as two of the three nodes, employed algorithms could 
deduce that redundancy being performed, in spite of the fact it 
has not performed [41].  
f) 8.6. Selective Forwarding: A routing node has a main 
liability which is forwarding packets. However, any packet 
could be dropped and other ones might be forwarded 
intentionally by a malicious node. An unsuccessful detection 
framework to recognize the selective forwarding attack is 
suggested by Wang et al. [42]. The number of packets which 
must forward should be same to the number of packets that it 
receives and it is supervised for a routing node. Every sensor 
node can act under a promiscuous manner in their framework 
therefore; it can overhear the transmission of neighboring 
nodes [45]. The neighbor is able to cooperate with other 
neighbors of the suspected node, and a decision about the 
suspected node is created through gathering the ideas from the 
suspected node‘s neighbors, on the condition that a neighbor 
of a suspected node detects exceeding a specific threshold in 
the packet number which failed to forward by the suspected 
node [43, 45]. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The demand for security in WSNs becomes more obvious 
during ability growth of WSNs and they are used much more, 
however, in WSNs the node nature causes limitations like 
restricted energy, capability of processing, and storage 
capacity.  These restrictions create WSNs so distinctive from 
conventional ad hoc wireless networks. Specific methods and 
protocols have been advanced to utilize in WSNs. All of the 
mentioned security dangers including the Hello flood attack, 
wormhole attack, Sybil attack, sinkhole attack, offer one usual 
goal which is for compromising the integrity of the network 
they attack.  
The security of WSNs has become a major subject since of 
the different dangers appearing and the significance of data 
confidentiality, although in the past, there was a little 
concentration on WSNs security. There are several solutions to 
secure against all dangers, although some solutions have 
previously been suggested. In this article, we principally 
concentrate on the threats in WSN security and the abstract of 
the WSNs threats which influence various layers along with 
their defense techniques is presented. In recent times, in place 
of focusing on various layers, scientists are trying for 
integrated system for security mechanism. The most usual 
security danger in various layers and the most reasonable 
solution in this paper are presented. 
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